US and EU Efforts to Combat International Money Laundering in the Art Market are no Masterpiece by Burroughs, Timothy E.
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
Volume 52 
Issue 4 October 2019 Article 6 
2019 
US and EU Efforts to Combat International Money Laundering in 
the Art Market are no Masterpiece 
Timothy E. Burroughs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Timothy E. Burroughs, US and EU Efforts to Combat International Money Laundering in the Art Market are 
no Masterpiece, 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1061 (2021) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol52/iss4/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For 
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Notes:
US and EU Efforts to Combat
International Money Laundering
in the Art Market are no
Masterpiece
ABSTRACT
Despite the lack of significant, tangible evidence of money
laundering through fine art and antiquities dealers, the EU
recently passed the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive
adding art dealers to the list of businesses obligated to comply
with record keeping and due diligence requirements. Shortly
thereafter, a similar measure was proposed in the U.S. House of
Representatives. However, one-size-fits-all unilateral regulations
will fail to protect the fine art and antiquities industry and will
place crippling burdens on many art market participants.
Instead, soft law agreements, used for most international finance
regulation, should be the main tool to establish international
standards. This Note suggests that the Financial Action Task
Force, an international anti-money laundering institution,
should create a flexible framework for risk-based regulations and
international information sharing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Government corruption, shell corporations, "The Wolf of Wall
Street," and a Picasso or two-no, not a new Dan Brown novel-but
details from the latest case of money laundering involving the art
industry.' An ongoing international investigation revealed in 2016
that Malaysian government officials and their co-conspirators hid more
than $1 billion worth of embezzled funds in the United States in assets
such as real estate and artwork.2
Throughout history, criminals have sought ways to "clean" illicit
money acquired through illegal activities. The process of "cleaning
money," commonly referred to as money laundering, is accomplished
through a range of techniques that allow criminal proceeds to enter
legitimate financial markets. As regulators and law enforcement
tighten control over traditional methods used to launder money, art
and cultural artifacts are becoming increasingly appealing tools for
money laundering.3
The art market's tradition of secrecy and discretion relating to
purchases and sales presents a challenge to regulators. Terrorist
financiers, in addition to money launderers, have also identified the
1. Louise Story, U.S. Targets $1 Billion in Assets in Malaysian Embezzlement
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/world/asia/lmdb-
malaysia-us-assets-seized.html [https://perma.cc/2GQP-ZPPE] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
2. Id.
3. See Rick St. Hilaire, Shouldn't Art and Antiquities Sellers Be Subject to Anti-
Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorist Financing Laws?, CULTURAL HERITAGE L. (Aug.
9, 2016), http://culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com/2016/08/shouldnt-art-and-
antiquities-sellers-be.html [https://perma.ccXY4A-NJ8P] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
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fine art and artifacts markets as potential avenues to fund their
activities.4 The highly publicized illegal sales of cultural artifacts from
war-torn parts of the Middle East5 and the release of the Panama
Papers in 20156 highlighted the misuse of the art market for illicit gain
and attracted increased scrutiny over financial transactions involving
art." Since the art market serves a global clientele, domestic law
enforcement is frequently inadequate or limited in its ability to
investigate and prosecute these crimes.
International organizations, including the Basel Institute on
Governance, have issued new guidelines aimed at making the art
industry less susceptible to money laundering.
8  These
recommendations include enacting new domestic regulations requiring
art dealers, galleries, and auction houses to maintain detailed records
about their clientele and requiring the reporting of suspicious financial
activity within these institutions.9 International art market players
approached the Basel Institute as early as 2008 to draft rules focusing
on self-regulation.10 However, this approach failed to ease concerns or
gain widespread acceptance." The Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), the world's leading international anti-money laundering
4. See Michaelene K. Wright, Financing Cr-ISIS: The Efficacy of Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties in the Context of Money Laundering and Terror Finance, 52 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 229, 230 (2019) (discussing domestic law enforcement's reliance on
mutual legal assistance treaties to investigate international crimes).
5. Deborah Lehr, Art and Antiquities: Conduits for Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing, ACAMS TODAY (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.acamstoday.orglart-
and-antiquities-conduits-for-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/
[https://perma.cclHTG2-DE8X] (archived Aug. 5, 2019). Although not directly linked to
terrorists, Hobby Lobby was forced to forfeit thousands of artifacts smuggled out of Iraq
and pay a $3 million fine. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, United States Files Civil Action
to Forfeit Thousands of Ancient Iraqi Artifacts Imported by Hobby Lobby (July 5, 2017)
(on file with author).
6. Scott Reyburn, What the Panama Papers Reveal About the Art Market, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/arts/design/what-the-
panama-papers-reveal-about-the-art-market.html [https://perma.cc/S9TL-C8W2]
(archived Aug. 5, 2019).
7. See European Commission Statement/18/3429, Statement By First Vice-
President Timmermans, Vice-President Dombrovskis and Commissioner Jourova on the
adoption by the European Parliament of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Apr.
19, 2018); Rick St. Hilaire, Proposed Bill Enlists Art & Antiquities Dealers in the Fight
Against Money Laundering, CULTURAL HERITAGE L. (May 21, 2018),
http://culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com/2018/05/proposed-bill-enlists-art-
antiquities.html [https://perma.cc/7KU3-H2W3] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
8. Basel Art Trade Anti-Money Laundering Principles, BASEL INST. ON
GOVERNANCE 3 (Jan. 2018), https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/
2 019 -
01/Basel%2OArt%2OTrade%20AML%2OPrinciples%202018.pdf [https://perma.cclS7DE-
AR8Z] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
9. Hilaire, supra note 7.
10. See Thomas Christ, The Basel Art Trade Guidelines 10 Years On, FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRAc. ACT BLOG (Jan. 30, 2018, 8:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/1
/30/dr-thomas-christ-the-basel-art-trade-guidelines-10-years-on.html
[https://perma.cclPJC6-VU7Z] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
11. See id.
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organization, subsequently labeled the art market in some countries as
"high-risk" for financial crimes.12
In response to these concerns, the European Union passed the
Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive on April 19, 2018.13 The
directive requires listed entities to conduct customer due diligence
searches, commonly referred to as know your customer (KYC)
requirements, and to identify and notify the proper authorities of
suspicious activity by clients via suspicious activity reports (SAR) or
an equivalent process.14 Prior directives required auditors, tax
advisors, real estate brokers, gambling services, and credit and
financial institutions to follow the SAR and KYC requirements.15 The
Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive adds "persons trading or
acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art, including ... art
galleries and auction houses, where the value of the transaction ...
amounts to EUR 10,000 or more" to the list.16 Similarly, on May 18,
2018, Representative Luke Messer introduced H.R. 5886 to the House
of Representatives.17 The bill, titled the "Illicit Art and Antiquities
Trafficking Prevention Act," amends the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to
include dealers in art or antiquities on the list of businesses that are
required to follow record keeping guidelines and report possible
criminal activity.' 8
Unfortunately, these new laws offer minimal deterrence to
potential money launderers and shift the burden of detecting and
reporting money laundering from law enforcement to art and
antiquities dealers. Further, dealers already face significant
responsibilities to ensure the authentication of works and compliance
with domestic and international laws regarding art theft, looting and
trade in goods from endangered species.'9 Adding to their burden could
prove devastatingly expensive and ineffective. However, self-
12. See id.
13. Eileen Kinsella, Art Dealers Push Back Against the European Union's New
Money-Laundering Regulations, ARTNET NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), https://news.artnet.coml
art-world/european-union-tightens-art-market-oversight- 1275338 [https://perma.cc/
DFQ4-2YDD] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
14. Council Directive 2018/843, art. 1, 2018 O.J. (L 156/53) (EU); see Fact Sheet
on Strengthened EU rules to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing,
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR JUSTICE & CONSUMERS (July 9, 2018).
15. Council Directive 2015/849, art. 2, 2015 O.J. (L 141/73) (EU).
16. Council Directive 2018/843, supra note 14; see Fact Sheet on Strengthened EU
rules to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing, supra note 14.
17. H.R. 5886, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
18. See id.; Hilaire, supra note 7.
19. See Code of Ethics, CONFADCRATION INTERNATIONALE DES NkGOCIANTS EN
OEUVRES D'ART (CINOA), https://www.cinoa.org/cinoalcodeofethics (last visited Sept. 2,
2019) [https://perma.cclVFT8-XWXM] (archived Aug. 5, 2019) (describing CINOA's
ethical guidelines); see generally Leonard D. DuBoff, Controlling the Artful Con:
Authentication and Regulation, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 973 (1976).
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regulation raises additional problems without seeming to impose a
significant check.20
International money laundering in art and antiquities illustrates
both the complex challenges of regulating international finance and
the tangible impact that well-intentioned regulation can have on
legitimate business dealings. This Note will provide a background of
money laundering in the art market, followed by an analysis of the
enacted EU and proposed US measures and conclude that a uniform,
international strategy is necessary to protect the art market and art
businesses from abuse by money launderers.
Part II of this Note presents the history of money laundering
through art, and also documents efforts, both domestic and
international, to regulate it. Since a large segment of the international
art market is located in the United States and the European Union,
this Note will focus on those jurisdictions.
Part III will focus on new measures introduced in the United
States and enacted in the European Union, and provide an analysis of
the intended goals, strengths and the arguments against the measures.
This analysis will require an exploration of how international soft law
dominates most international financial regulation.
Part IV proposes an alternative strategy for discouraging and
preventing money laundering in the art market by focusing on
international soft law agreements and uniform FATF guidelines that
use a risk-based approach to regulation and encourage greater
information sharing.
II. MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE ART MARKET
A. The Problem of Money Laundering
Money laundering dates back more than two thousand years to a
group of prosperous Chinese merchants who engaged in illegal
activities and looked for ways to "cleanse" their profits.
21 The term
"money laundering" was coined in the United States during the 1920s
and quickly became popularized because of the notorious rise in crime
during the Prohibition era.
22
Money laundering is defined as the "disguising or concealing of
the illegal origin(s) of the proceeds of crime."23 There are three main
20. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 158 (1992)
(concluding that effective self-regulation in the diamond industry is only effective where
participants' interests align with industry norms).
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steps to the process: placement, layering, and integration.24 The first
step is collecting and placing illegal funds in multiple bank accounts or
other financial institutions.2 5 Next, illegal funds are layered, meaning
the funds are transferred from various banks in various locations to
conceal when and where the funds enter the financial system and the
time and place they will eventually leave.26 During the final step,
integration, illegal funds are mixed into the legitimate economy and
markets.27 These funds now are virtually indistinguishable from their
legitimate counterparts and create a significant challenge to any
regulator or law enforcement official attempting to "follow the money"
and detect or trace the original criminal activity. 28
The archetypical example follows. Criminal proceeds are collected
by a money launderer and placed in bank accounts or used to purchase
a series of monetary instruments that are deposited into accounts at
another location.2 9 The money launderer layers the funds by using a
complex chain of domestic and international shell company accounts,
utilizing virtual currencies or by using trade-based techniques such as
purchasing high-value goods and then shipping and reselling the goods
overseas.30 Finally, the laundered funds are returned to clients for
investment or asset acquisition, which could include the purchase of
luxury goods.3 1
Financial institutions play a critical role in the money laundering
process.3 2 Governments responded by imposing record keeping and
reporting requirements, such as know your customer (KYC)33 and
suspicious activity reporting (SAR), on a range of financial institutions
through measures such as the US Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970.34
KYC is an internal record keeping and verification requirement.3 5 The
24. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, PROFESSIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING 15-16 (2018),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/medialfatfldocuments/Professional-Money-Laundering.pdf
[https://perma.cclJD8D-FWLQ] (archived Oct. 1, 2019) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL
MONEY LAUNDERING].
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Mark Motivans, Money Laundering Offenders, 1994-2001, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2 (July 2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdfl
mlo01.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMT2-Z689] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
29. PROFESSIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24, at 18; Money Laundering
FAQ, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2019) [https://perma.ccl8EVF-V273] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
30. PROFESSIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24, at 30.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 17-18.
33. Some jurisdictions refer to these programs as customer information programs
(CIP) or customer due diligence (CDD).
34. Purkey, supra note 21, at 111; Anna Louie Sussman, Galleries Could Face
"Unnecessary and Onerous" Regulation under New Legislation, ARTSY (May 24, 2018),
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-galleries-face-unnecessary-onerous-
regulation-new-legislation [https://perma.cc/F4S5-WLZU] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
35. Basel Art Trade Anti-Money Laundering Principles, supra note 8.
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exact information an institution is required to collect and the level of
verification required varies by industry and the nature of the financial
transaction.36 Generally, KYC programs require "covered financial
institutions . . . to obtain, verify, and record the identities of the
beneficial owners."3 7 SARs are filed electronically and are available to
federal and local law enforcement agencies.3 8 Originally designed to
prevent domestic money laundering, the BSA has expanded to combat
terrorism financing and other financial transaction crimes.
3 9 Since
governments are heavily involved in the regulation of banks and
financial institutions, tightening regulations and reporting
requirements to combat money laundering in financial markets and
institutions is widely accepted and minimally burdensome to regulated
entities.40
Laundering money through real estate assets is also an attractive
option.41 Traditionally, real estate, like art, is "classified as non-
financial, and therefore lacks the regulation and rigid, standardized
controls in place for the financial sector."
42 However, in the United
States for example, lawmakers expanded the BSA to cover most real
36. In the United States, these requirements are separated into Customer
Identification Program (CIP) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD). CIP requires the
collection of personal information and document verification of that information.
Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 31 C.F.R. §§ 1020.220,
1023.220, 1024.220, 1026.220 (2018). CDD applies to legal entities customers and
requires: "(1) identify and verify the identity of customers; (2) identify and verify the
identity of the beneficial owners of companies opening accounts; (3) understand the
nature and purpose of customer relationships to develop customer risk profiles; and (4)
conduct ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk
basis, to maintain and update customer information." 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010, 1020, 1023,
1024, 1026.
37. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Customer Due Diligence Requirements
for Financial Institutions, FIN-2016-G003, FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK (July 19, 2016),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2016-09/FAQs_forCDD-Final Rule_%287_15
16%29.pdf [https://perma.cclVBP5-ZZ5T] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
38. Mandatory E-Filing FAQs, FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/mandatory-e-filing-faqs (last visited Oct. 1, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/975Y-9FPZ] (archived Aug. 6, 2019); Law Enforcement Overview, FIN.
CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement-overview
(last visited Oct. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/YEN3-FGYC] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
39. See Sussman, supra note 34 (providing background information on the Bank
Secrecy Act).
40. See Purkey, supra note 21, at 111. But see Lanier Saperstein & Geoffrey Sant,
Account Closed: How Bank 'De-Risking' Hurts Legitimate Customers, WALL ST. J., Aug.
12, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/account-closed-how-bank-de-risking-hurts-
legitimate-customers-14
3 9 4 1909 3 [https://perma.cc/QV8Q-RE4E] (archived Oct. 1,
2019).
41. The FATF Recommendations, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 15 (2012),
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-
recommendations.html (last updated June, 2019) [https://perma.cc/QT26-2SJF]
(archived Oct. 1, 2019).
42. FAUSTo MARTIN DE SANCTIS, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH ART: A
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE 58 (Springer 2013).
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estate transactions.4 3 This action imposed a number of requirements
to deter money laundering, such as KYC and SAR requirements
overseen by the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN).44 These regulations are
supplemented by FinCEN's issuance of geographic targeting orders
that require real estate companies in high-risk areas to report high-
end, all-cash residential real estate transactions.45
Art and similar assets can be used at all three money-laundering
stages-placement, layering, and integration-making the art market
a particularly appealing target for financial criminals. It is also
important to note that none of the previous efforts to regulate financial
institutions or real estate have completely deterred money launderers
from using these vehicles.46 Instead, these efforts have alerted
criminals to the added scrutiny faced by these institutions.47
Beyond its facilitation of the underlying crime, money laundering
brings potential negative macroeconomic consequences including
"inexplicable changes in money demand, prudential risks to bank
soundness, contamination effects on legal financial transactions, and
increased volatility of international capital flows and exchange rates
due to unanticipated cross-border asset transfers."48 Tightening anti-
money laundering regulations can effectively combat the original crime
by making illegal activity unprofitable.49
B. International Money Laundering in the Art Market
Money laundering, in and of itself, is a criminal offense in most
jurisdictions.5 0 In the United States, an individual is criminally liable
if they act with knowledge "that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,"
and that individual "conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity" with the intent to facilitate the underlying specified unlawful
activity or to violate the Internal Revenue Code.51 A violation is
punishable by a maximum fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the
43. U.S. Regulators Tackle Money Laundering in the Luxury Home Market,
REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.comlen/insights/articles/u-s-regulators-tackle-
money-laundering-luxury-home-market (last visited Sept. 2, 2019)
[https://perma.cclV9B6-8DRWJ (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
44. Id. ("FinCEN estimates that requiring the mortgage lending industry to file
SARs puts 78% of residential purchases in the U.S. subject to BSA/AML compliance.").
45. Id.
46. Purkey, supra note 21, at 117.
47. Id.
48. Money Laundering FAQ, supra note 29.
49. See id.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2018).
51. Id.
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property involved.52 However, money laundering is rarely the sole
charge against a defendant and by its very nature, usually is part of a
larger illegal conspiracy.5 3 This subpart focuses on money laundering
generally and how it fits into a criminal enterprise by describing
techniques to launder money using art, the characteristics of the art
market that make it susceptible to money laundering, and the scope of
the problem.
1. How Art is Used to Launder Money
There are many strategies to launder money in the art market.
54
Falsely describing goods and services is a common way to hide or
transfer assets. The former Brazilian banker, Edemar Cid Ferreira,
utilized this technique in 2013. According to court documents, Ferreira
used art-including a work by Jean-Michel Basquiat worth $8
million-to transfer illegal funds across international borders.
5 5 The
painting was originally purchased in 2004 for $1 million by a
Panamanian company, under Ferreira's control, which later tried to
sell the painting for $5 million.56 In 2007, the company moved the work
through four shipping agents in two countries before the painting
arrived in New York.5 7 In the United States, merchandise valued at
less than $200 may enter without customs documentation, duty, or
tax.5 8 The crate containing the painting had an air bill stating that the
unnamed painting inside was worth $100 and it was cleared for entry
into the country with minimal scrutiny.
5 9 Though Ferreira was later
caught, this incident exemplifies how art provides an appealing vehicle
for criminals to transfer and disguise proceeds from criminal activity.
By misrepresenting the value of an item, criminals can transfer value
between parties and across borders.
60
Further, art market professionals may facilitate deals directly
with criminals. Nathan Isen, an art dealer in Philadelphia had a
history of selling art to a local marijuana dealer, Ronald Belciano.
61
52. Id.
53. Criminal Resource Manual, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., 2101-99,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2101-money-laundering-overview
(last visited Sept. 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AKG5-GBFY] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
54. Purkey, supra note 21, at 126.
55. Patricia Cohen, Valuable as Art, but Priceless as a Tool to Launder Money,







60. See Purkey, supra note 21, at 126.
61. Steve Volk, The Curious Case of Nicky Isen, PHILA. MAG. (Aug. 9, 2015, 5:59
AM), https://www.phillymag.comlnews/2015/08/09/nathan-nicky-isen-art-philadelphia/
[https://perma.cclT5RG-5K5P] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
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Federal investigators never charged Isen with laundering money for
Belciano, but fifty-nine works of art sold by Isen to Belciano were later
seized by federal agents during an investigation of Belciano.62
Subsequently, in 2015, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement conducted a sting operation63 that led to Isen pleading
guilty and receiving three years of probation and a $25,000 fine for
accepting funds he was told were from criminal activity. 64
Additional methods include over- and under-invoicing and
multiple invoicing. The over- and under-invoicing method requires that
the price of a good be artificially inflated and then deflated to transfer
value between two parties, such as a seller and buyer or an importer
and exporter.6 5 Over- and under-invoicing takes advantage of volatile
pricing in the art market.6 6 The latter method, multiple invoicing,
involves creating multiple charges for the same good or service.67 The
price is left alone at the correct value, but by duplicating the
transaction, money launderers create a gap between the recorded price
and what is being paid.6 8 A fraudulently duplicated transaction can be
challenging for authorities to distinguish from a mistakenly duplicated
transaction.69 These techniques both create artificial paper trails that
later can be used by money launderers to mislead art dealers'
investigations into the provenance of the artwork or bankers'
investigations as to the origins of the funds.
2. Weaknesses and Susceptibilities in the Art Market: Pricing, Theft,
and Anonymity
Many observers, fueled by headline-grabbing cases, now view the
art market as an appealing target for large-scale money laundering.70
The art market is particularly susceptible to financial crimes because
of the speculative value of its items, the notorious secrecy in the
industry, the prevalence of art-related crimes, and the combined
international nature of the market and the portability of the objects.7 '
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. David Heurtevent & Adrien Chiariello, Addressing Money Laundering and
Terrorism Financing Vulnerabilities in Art and Collectibles, in ART & FINANCE REPORT
258 (5th ed. 2017).





70. Id. at 118; see generally Christ, supra note 10; Eric Reguly, The link between
art and money laundering, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/european-
business/economists-urge-tighter-regulations-to-curb-money-laundering-in-art-market/
article26217852/ [https://perma.c/5AWX-6GGP] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
71. Purkey, supra note 21, at 126; see DuBoff, supra note 19, at 973.
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Much of the art market's vulnerability to money laundering arises
from the speculative value of objects, which may allow for improper
price manipulation.7 2 For example, in 2005, at an estate auction, a
painting of Jesus Christ thought to be painted by a follower of
Leonardo da Vinci sold for less than $10,000.73 The work, then claimed
to be from the master himself, was offered for sale in 2012 for $200
million but failed to sell until it sold in 2013 for $80 million. 7 The work
quickly sold again for $127.5 million. 75 Then, at a historic auction at
Christie's in New York City in 2017, the painting, now widely believed
to be by da Vinci,7 6 sold for $450.3 million, currently the world record
for a work of art.7 7
Art appraisers consider the artist, era, provenance, size, aesthetic
appeal, and trends in the market to project the value of an object.
78
Consumers rely on art dealers and appraisers' expertise to determine
value and to authenticate works they currently own or intend to sell.
Authentication relies on both scientific testing and stylistic opinions,
but the process is far from perfect." After its "discovery" in 2005, the
painting, now believed to be by da Vinci, went through more than six
years of research and investigation to establish its authenticity.80 The
painting's inclusion in the National Gallery London's81 2011-12
exhibition of da Vinci's surviving paintings solidified its authenticity
in the eyes of most in the industry.8 2 However, leading up to the world
record sale at Christie's, art historians and da Vinci specialists
72. Purkey, supra note 21, at 126.
73. Robin Pogrebin & Scott Reyburn, Leonardo da Vinci Painting Sells for $450.3
Million, Shattering Auction Highs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/15/arts/design/leonardo-da-vinci-salvator-mundi-christies-auction.html
[https://perma.cc/UM9B-Q3PL] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. There are fewer than twenty works acknowledged as being from Leonardo's
own hand and all others are in museum collections thus unlikely to become available for
private ownership. Leonardo's Salvator Mundi Makes Auction History, CHRISTIE'S (Nov.
15, 2017), https://www.christies.com/features/Leonardo-and-Post-War-results-New-
York-8729-3.aspx [https://perma.cc/TH3F-G5G3] (archived Aug. 6, 2019) [hereinafter
CHRISTIE'S].
77. Pogrebin & Reyburn, supra note 73.
78. See DuBoff, supra note 19, at 973.
79. Id.
80. CHRISTIE'S, supra note 76. It was also established that the painting sold in
1958 at Christie's rival, Sotheby's, for £45. Jonathan Jones, Leonardo's lost' Christ, sold
for £45 in 1956 - now valued at 9120m, GUARDIAN, July 12, 2011,
https://www.theguardian.comlartanddesign/2011/jul/12/leonardo-portrait-of-christ-
salvator-mundi [https://perma.cc/98WG-V6M5] (archived Aug. 20, 2019).
81. Public institutions can play a significant role in driving up a work's value. See
Paul Sullivan, A Museum's Seal ofApproval Can Add to Art's Value, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/your-money/a-museums-seal-of-approval-
can-add-to-arts-value.html [https://perma.cc/N5LN-WYRC] (archived Aug. 20, 2019).
82. The painting had been significantly obscured by overpaints and labeled a
copy. See Leonardo's Salvator Mundi Makes Auction History, supra note 76.
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criticized the work claiming "it's a good studio work with a little
Leonardo at best."83
Authenticators' incentives play a role in the process and may not
always align with their clients' interests. Discovering a long-lost
masterwork or discrediting a painting headlining a prestigious auction
can gain an authenticator international notoriety.84 Alternatively, the
costs of inaccurate authentication, both financial and reputational,
may be career ending.8 5 After their death, many modern artists' estates
set up authentication panels to control the authentication process.86
Recently, disgruntled art owners have brought multiple lawsuits
against such panels, claiming their artworks have been unfairly
discredited.8 7 These panels were designed to provide stability to the
market by giving buyers an alternative to relying purely on seller's
opinions of authentication, which also has led to lawsuits. 88 Even once
authenticated, experts struggle to accurately predict value as many
works are frequently sold for significantly more or less than their
sticker price or projected value.89
The art market is known for its secrecy and discretion."o Works
are frequently offered for sale anonymously and buyers are often
represented by auction house employees on the phone with their
clients. This practice occasionally results in unfortunate situations.
Ownership challenges are sometimes made when works are advertised
for sale at auction, which may result in sales being put on hold.9 1
Additionally, anonymity can be further complicated when buyers and
sellers are represented by agents. The da Vinci's previous owner, a
Russian collector, is currently engaged in a worldwide legal battle
against his former art advisor whom he accuses of inflating artwork
prices while the advisor acted as his agent.92 The art advisor claims he
83. Pogrebin & Reyburn, supra note 73.
84. DuBoff, supra note 19, at 973.
85. Id.
86. Eileen Kinsella, Judge Throws Out Closely Watched Lawsuit Against the
Agnes Martin Authentication Committee, ARTNET NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-agnes-martin-committee-
1260539 [https://perma.cc/3MTL-MZNT] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
87. Id.; Complaint at 1-3, Mayor Gallery Ltd. v. Agnes Martin Catalogue
Raisonne LLC, No. 655489/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 2018).
88. Kinsella, supra note 86.
89. See Purkey, supra note 21, at 115.
90. See Graham Bowley & William K. Rashbaum, Has the Art Market Become an
Unwitting Partner in Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
02/19/arts/design/has-the-art-market-become-an-unwitting-partner-in-crime.html
[https://perma.cc/K3JT-JE8YJ (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
91. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Despite Court Ruling, Christie's Pulls Painting
From Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/08/arts/09
picasso.html [https://perma.cc/57U7-FEMC] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
92. Katya Kazakina, Billionaire Slaps Sotheby's With $380 Million Lawsuit,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-
02/billionaire-rybolovlev-slaps-sotheby-s-with-380-milion-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/5HKY-DPT5] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
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was merely acting as a middleman and resold works to the Russian
collector instead of representing him.
9 3
Additionally, certain storage facilities, called freeports, pride
themselves in providing secure and discrete storage for high-value
goods.94 Freeports and similar storage facilities allow owners to avoid
paying import taxes, since the stored item has yet to legally enter the
country.9 5 At one of the most famous freeports in Switzerland, a
specialist art journal estimated 1.2 million works of art were stored
there.96 The Swiss government has made efforts to tighten regulations
on freeports;9 7 however, new ones are opening across the globe.
9 8
Market participants defend the practice of concealing identities by
pointing to the legitimate reasons clients may prefer secrecy. Many
major art sales follow what the industry calls the "three D's: death,
debt, and divorce."9 9 Clients prefer anonymity to prevent the added
embarrassment of having their personal lives on display to the
world.10 0 A variety of legitimate concerns could arise from revealing
their participation in transactions.1 01 Fear of negative backlash over
93. Id.
94. David Honig, No Secrets About Money Laundering, CTR. FOR ART LAW (July
17, 2016), https://itsartlaw.com/2016/07/17/no-secrets-about-money-laundering/
[https://perma.cc/XRX4-Z5L5] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
95. See David Segal, Swiss Freeports Are Home for a Growing Treasury of Art,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/business/swiss-
freeports-are-home-for-a-growing-treasury-of-art.html?mtrref-www.google.com&gwh=
9129EF794047C904522844EAC5B2FD27&gwt-pay&assetType=REGIWALL
[https://perma.cc/L89C-NPJM] (archived Aug. 20, 2019).
96. Rachel A.J. Pownall, TEFAFArt Market Report 2017, EUR. FINE ART FOUND.,
http://luyxqn3lzdsa2ytyzjlasxmmmpt.wpengine.netdna-cdn.comlwp-
content/uploads/2017/03/TEFAF-Art-Market-Report-20173.pdf (last visited Sept. 2,
2019) [https://perma.cc/AAD2-6U2Z] (archived Oct. 1, 2019) ("There is no way to know
how much is held in these warehouses, although it is predicted that 1.2 million artworks
are held by Geneva Free Ports.").
97. Efforts to reform practice at Swiss freeports are in motion such as tighter
KYC requirements and the closing of some of the tax loopholes. See Katie L. Steiner,
Note, Dealing with Laundering in the Swiss Art Market: New Legislation and its Threat
to Honest Traders, 49 CASE W. RES. J. IN'L L. 351, 366 (2017); see also Henri Neuendorf,
Switzerland's Tough New Stance on Freeports Will Shake the Art World, ARTNET NEWS
(Nov. 19, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/market/switzerland-freeport-regulations-
367361 [https://perma.cc/QRJ4-8JET] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
98. Freeports have recently opened in Singapore, Monaco, China, and
Luxemburg. See Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural
Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, U.N.
EDUC., ScT. & CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO) ¶ 12 (July 2016), http://www.unesco.org/new/
fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdfl2_FC free-port-working-document FinalEN_r
evclean.pdf [https://perma.cclBY6P-59XG] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
99. Richard M. Smith, The Art of Auctions: Christie's CEO Edward Dolman,
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2010), https://www.newsweek.comlart-auctions-christies-ceo-
edward-dolman-74999 [https://perma.cclNGX7-K6RD] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
100. Purkey, supra note 21, at 115.
101. Id.
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extravagant purchases and becoming a target for art thieves or other
criminal activity might motivate a collector to remain unknown.102
Art crime further complicates the industry.0 3 Art theft is one of
the most profitable illegal trades in the world, with approximately $6
billion worth of art stolen worldwide per year.10 4 With many countries,
including members of the European Union and the United States, only
loosely regulating the importation of art, there is little deterrence to
moving stolen goods across borders.0 5 Additionally, art theft
frequently goes unreported due to fear, embarrassment, and
confusion.1 0 6 However, if the thieves attempt to sell the work through
a legitimate market, large international databases of stolen art exist
and are routinely checked by major dealers and large auction houses
before they agree to accept the work for sale.07
Finally, as highlighted by the aforementioned story of Brazilian
banker Edemar Cid Ferreira, the industry's global presence and the
portability of goods can make art objects exceedingly difficult to track
or detect.'0 8 Ferreira brought an $8 million painting into the United
States undetected by claiming it was worth only $100.109 Moving one
painting is significantly more appealing than other goods of
comparative value. For comparison, $8 million worth of gold would
weigh approximately 574.88 pounds and $8 million worth of one-
hundred-dollar bills would weigh 176 pounds.1 10 Undoubtedly, that
amount of gold or one-hundred-dollar bills would raise significantly
more eyebrows at customs.
102. Steiner, supra note 97, at 366.
103. Authentication and art crime frequently go together. For example, in 2013 a
Long Island art dealer was involved in a $30 million scheme selling forgeries out of two
Manhattan galleries claiming the works were masterpieces by artists such as Jackson
Pollock, Mark Rothko, and Robert Motherwell to unsuspecting buyers. Press Release,
U.S. Att'ys Office, S.D.N.Y., Long Island Art Dealer Indicted for Massive Art Fraud,
Money Laundering, and Tax Scheme (July 17, 2013) (on file with the U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
104. Kenneth Polk, Art Theft, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/art-theft (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) [https://perma.ccHY39-VKHP] (archived Aug.
20, 2019); see NathanVardi, The World's Biggest Illicit Industries, FORBES (June 4, 2010,
12:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/06/04/biggest-illegal-businesses-business-crime
slide.html#5083afa0760a [https://perma.cc/B8EU-DC2F] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
105. Purkey, supra note 21, at 119.
106. See id. at 120 (noting museums are known to underreport art theft because
they do not want to draw additional attention to their minimal security levels).
107. Polk, supra note 104.
108. Cohen, supra note 55.
109. Id.
110. Honig, supra note 94.
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3. Scope of the Art Market
The size, wealth, and international presence of the art market
presents significant challenges to regulators while making it an
appealing target for money launderers. The international art market
continues to grow, becoming a $63.7 billion industry in 2017, up 12
percent from the previous year.1' Three countries capture most of the
art market. The United States accounts for 42 percent of the market,
with China and the United Kingdom at 21 percent and 20 percent of
the market, respectively.112 Art market participants include auction
houses, dealers, and galleries, who may offer a range of services beyond
buying and selling, including appraisals, authentication, and storage.
Art dealers and galleries make up approximately 53 percent of the
market value by sales,1 13 with auction houses capturing approximately
47 percent.114 While many headline-grabbing sales take place at
auction houses, the industry is dispersed across many smaller galleries
across the globe." 5
Despite the size of the industry, known examples of art used to
launder money are few. A 2017 report by the consulting firm Deloitte
struggled to determine the exact scope of illicit trafficking of cultural
goods in the European Union.116 Currently there are no widely
accepted estimates on the amount of money laundered in the art
market, although the general belief is that it is enormous and
expanding as regulations on other asset classes are more rigidly
regulated."7 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
estimates that the total amount of money laundered globally is roughly
111. Global Art Market Reaches USD 63.7 billion in 2017, with Dealers Taking the
Lion's Share, ART BASEL, https://www.artbasel.com/news/global-art-market-reaches-
usd-63-7-billion-in-2017--with-dealers-taking-the-lion-s-share (last visited Sept. 2, 2019)
[https://perma.cclJC2P-AXQ4] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
112. Id.
113. Clare McAndrew, The Art Market 2018, ART BASEL & UBS 30 (2018),
https://d2u3kfwd92fzu7.cloudfront.net/Art%2Basel%20and%20UBSThe%
2 0Art%2 0
Market2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N3S-WHPT] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
114. Henri Neuendorf, The $11 Billion Global Auction Market Rebounded by 25%
Last Year, Says New Report, ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/
market/art-auction-market-report-2017-1
2 0 0 9 9 2  [https://perma.cclUVP4-DQYC]
(archived Aug. 7, 2019) (the three major action houses, Christie's, Sotheby's, and Philips
increased global auction sales by 25 percent in 2017 from the previous year); id.
115. McAndrew, supra note 113, at 30 ("The share often shifts more towards
auctions when the market is buoyant and there is an optimistic outlook for sales, with
sellers enticed to the public auction market by its potential for greater than anticipated
prices. While this appears to have been the case in 2017, it was also due to the small
number of very high-value auction sales, which masked weaknesses evident in some
segments of the auction market.')
116. Rep. of the European Comm'n Report, Fighting Illicit Trafficking in Cultural
Goods: Analysis of Customs Issues in the EU, at 27 (June 2017).
117. Reguly, supra note 70.
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2-5 percent of global GDP or $800 billion to $2 trillion annually.118
Economists, such as Nouriel Roubini of New York University's Stern
School of Business, have been pleading for greater regulation of the
global art market.1 19 However, only 40 percent of wealth managers, 24
percent of art collectors, and 23 percent of art professionals favor
governmental regulation over self-regulation.120
International auction houses Sotheby's and Christie's boast
internal policies and procedures to detect money laundering.1 2
Christie's claims its anti-money laundering program includes "client,
transaction and artwork due diligence, monitoring, record keeping and
payment policy." 122 Their program includes compliance checks on new
clients and it requires corporate clients to prove the company's
ultimate ownership, making it harder for clients to hide behind shell
corporations. 123
Auction houses and dealers may face local licensing
requirements that vary in stringency by jurisdiction.124 Art dealers and
auction houses, along with almost all other industries in the United
States, are required to file reports of large cash payments to
government regulators.125
C. New EU and Proposed US Laws
Motivated by growing concerns, the European Union recently
passed new regulations to detect and prevent money laundering in the
art market, and the United States is considering similar measures. The
new legislation in the European Union and proposed legislation in the
United States attempt to apply the same anti-money laundering
policies that apply to banks, real estate transactions, casinos, and
precious stones, to art dealers.
118. Money-Laundering and Globalization, U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS & CRIME
(2019), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html
[https://perma.cc/C47Y-GQHD] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
119. Reguly, supra note 70.
120. ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, DELOITTE & ART TACTIC 243 (5th ed. 2017).
121. Samuel Rubenfeld, Art World's Response to Money-Laundering Concerns
Draws Critics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2017, https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2017/02/27/art-worlds-response-to-money-laundering-concerns-draws-critics/
[https://perma.c/8Y83-MQVF] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
122. Selling at Christie's: Liability Terms & Conditions, CHRSTIE'S (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.christies.com/selling-services/selling-guide/financial-information/
[https://perma.cclWQ9A-SB9D] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
123. Rubenfeld, supra note 121.
124. Purkey, supra note 21, at 121.
125. See FinCEN's Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFT NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/fincens-mandate-congress (la t visited Feb. 28, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/633L-LCSK] (archived Aug. 20, 2019).
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In the European Union, the European Parliament adopted the
Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive on April 19, 2018.126 The
directive's stated goals are: to enhance the powers of the EU Financial
Intelligence Units and increase their ability to find true owners of
companies and trusts; to prevent risks of money laundering from
virtual currencies and prepaid cards; to improve safeguards for
financial transactions involving high-risk countries; to enhance access
of financial law enforcement to bank records; and to centralize
financial data systems in all member states.127 The directive also
expands the entities covered by the rules to include persons trading in
works of art.128
Member states will implement the directive independently by
January 20, 2020.129 Although the directive provides some minimal
standards, it will be up to member states to clarify these rules and
regulations.130
The directive expands the requirements to perform KYC searches
for customers paying in cash over £10,000, when establishing a
business relationship, or when conducting occasional transactions that
amount to £15,000 or more.1 3' Additionally, a catchall provision
requires investigation when covered entities have mere suspicion of
money laundering or terrorist financing, or when those covered entities
doubt the legitimacy of previously gathered customer identification
data.132 The KYC measures require art dealers to verify the identity of
sellers and buyers, determine the beneficial owner and assess and
obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the proposed
business relationship, and conduct ongoing monitoring of the business
relationship.'3 3 There are caveats that allow member states to conduct
126. Council Directive 2018/843, supra note 14; see Fact Sheet on Strengthened EU
rules to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing, supra note 14; Anna Brady,
European Union tightens anti-money-laundering rules in the art market, ART





(archived Aug. 7, 2019).
127. See European Comm'n Statement/18/3429, Statement By First Vice-
President Timmermans, Vice-President Dombrovskis and Commissioner Jourova on the
adoption by the European Parliament of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Apr.
19, 2018).
128. Fact Sheet on Strengthened EU rules to prevent money laundering and
terrorism financing, supra note 14.
129. EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive Program Notes, CULTURAL PROP.
NEWS (Mar. 19, 2019), https://culturalpropertynews.org/notes-from-an-aba-program-on-
eu-5th-anti-money-laundering-directive/ [https://perma.cclV5G8-R2RA] (archived Aug.
7, 2019).
130. Id.
131. Council Directive 2015/849, supra note 15, at art. 11.
132. Id.
133. Id. at art. 13.
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risk assessments, which examine the nature of an industry, before
deciding how stringent these KYC requirements should be.'34
Member states are also required to have Financial Intelligence
Units to detect and effectively combat money laundering and terrorist
financing.1 3 5 Obligated entities, now including art dealers, are
required to file SARs, by their own initiative, "where the obliged entity
knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds,
regardless of the amount involved, are the proceeds of criminal activity
or are related to terrorist financing."136
In May 2018, Representative Luke Messer introduced a bill in the
U.S. House of Representatives that adds art and antiquities dealers to
the list of financial institutions covered by the Bank Secrecy Act.' 3 7
The bill's stated goal is to aid law enforcement's efforts to uncover
international money laundering and terrorist financing schemes.38
The Bank Secrecy Act, created in 1970, is designed to prevent
money laundering in major financial institutions by requiring KYC and
SAR procedures.3 9 Similar to the EU directive, the bill adds art
dealers to the list of covered institutions.14 0 The proposed legislation,
if passed, would direct FinCEN, the agency tasked with creating and
enforcing reporting and recordkeeping requirements under the statute,
to create new regulations that could require art and antiquities dealers
to establish internal anti-money laundering programs.141 For
example, dealers in precious metals, precious stones, or jewels must
implement an "anti-money laundering program reasonably designed
to prevent the dealer from being used to facilitate money laundering
and the financing of terrorist activities through the purchase and sale
of covered goods."142 Failure to follow these rules may result in steep
fines.143
Like the EU directive, many of the specific details of this bill are
unsettled.144 For example, the bill currently does not clarify who
134. Id. at arts. 13, 15, 17.
135. Id. at art. 32.
136. Id. at art. 33.
137. H.R. 5886, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
138. Id.
139. Zachary Small, Art Dealers Could Be Under More Financial Scrutiny with
New US Bill, HYPERALLERGIC (June 25, 2018), https://hyperallergic.com/448705/bank-
secrecy-act-art-dealers-luke-messer/ [https://perma.cclE3HY-T4QR (archived Aug. 8.
2019).
140. 31 U.S.C. § 5331 (2018); FinCEN's Mandate from Congress, supra note 125;
Small, supra note 139.
141. See Tim Schneider, The Gray Market: Why Congressional Regulation Would
Be a Gut Punch to Most American Art Dealers and Other Insights, ARTNET NEWS (May
7, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/market/gray-market-congressional-regulation-
1280003 [https://perma.cclL46Q-6GQD] (archived Aug. 8. 2019).
142. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 31 C.F.R. §
1027.210 (2018).
143. Small, supra note 139.
144. See EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive Program Notes, supra note 129.
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qualifies as a covered dealer of art and antiques, leaving the task of
writing specific regulations to FinCEN.1
45 Generally, America's anti-
money laundering and counter terrorist financing laws require luxury
and cash-intensive industries to satisfy recordkeeping requirements
and report possible criminal activity. 146 At a mimimum, recordkeeping
requirements will require art dealers to report cash payments over
$10,000.147 Although a US law is yet to be enacted,
148 the art
community has interpreted its introduction as a signal that the United
States intends to follow the European Union's lead in the near
future.149
III. EVALUATION OF NEW REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF),o
5 0 the leading
international money laundering watchdog group, recently labeled the
art market as a high-risk industry in multiple country reports.1
5 1
Industry reports, such as one produced by Deloitte in 2017, attempted
to quantify concerns about money laundering in the industry, reporting
that 65 percent of wealth managers surveyed, up from 56 percent the
previous year, believe that money laundering is a serious threat to the
art market.'5 2 With the two largest art markets, the European Union
and the United States, enacting and proposing new regulations,
change is coming to the art market.
1 5 3 This Note will now turn to two
related questions: will the regulation in the European Union and the
145. Sussman, supra note 34.
146. See Hilaire, supra note 7.
147. See id.
148. Bill H.R. 5886 died in committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, but in
March 2019, the House Financial Services Committee released three proposed bills one
of which included the addition of "dealers in art or antiquities" to the Bank Securities
Act. Peter D. Hardy, Art and Money Laundering, NAT'L L. REV. (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/art-and-money-laundering
[https://perma.ccl8SA5-T754] (archived Aug. 8, 2019).
149. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 121; Small, supra note 139.
150. "FATF is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of
its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating
money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the
international financial system. The FATF is therefore a "policy-making body" which
works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and
regulatory reforms in these areas." About, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BR2V-Z5HY] (archived Oct.
1, 2019).
151. Christ, supra note 10.
152. ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, supra note 120, at 237.
153. See McAndrew, supra note 113, at 34 (noting that the EU has 33 percent of
world sales by value, while the US has 42 percent of such sales).
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proposed changes in the United States prove effective at combating
money laundering? And, if not, what will?
A. Arguments for and against New EU and US Regulation
1. Shortcomings of Regulatory Requirements
Many believe the enacted EU measure and the proposed US
measure are too broad, impose undue burdens, and will have a chilling
effect on the industry.154 Three arguments made against the new laws
warrant exploration: (1) fears that the regulations will change the
nature of the industry, pushing clients seeking discretion to dealers
willing to circumnavigate regulations; (2) concerns that regulations
will place an undue financial burden on medium to smaller dealers who
cannot afford the requisite compliance departments and rely on a
small, loyal customer base and; (3) worries that benefits gained by new
regulations will be extremely limited, leaving significant loopholes for
money launderers to exploit.'5 5 However, supporters of these measures
counter justifiably that calls made by industry leaders and
organizations for self-regulation have fallen on deaf ears and, thus,
governmental action is needed.156
First, the very characteristics that make the industry attractive
to its customers, its discretion for buyers and sellers and the inherent
evolving aesthetic trends, make the industry vulnerable to money
laundering. Thus, dramatic changes to standard practices potentially
will chill the art market's recent growth. 5 7 Sellers and buyers may
prefer anonymity for a variety of legitimate reasons. Sales frequently
coincide with financial struggles and seller anonymity helps avoid
added publicity and embarrassment when a family or individual is
forced to part from artwork.5 8 Although the regulations do not
mandate client information to be made public, requiring dealers to
collect more extensive client information creates a greater opportunity
for that information to be leaked or inappropriately accessed.
As explained above, many legitimate reasons can trigger fine art
price fluctuation, a commonly noted vulnerability of the industry.5 9
For example, within a catalogue for a high-end auction, there is usually
a glossary of terms outlining the different levels of confidence the
154. EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive Program Notes, supra note 129.
155. Id.; CINOA Position Paper on the Proposed Revision of the 4th EU Anti Money
Laundering Directive, CONFEDtRATION INTERNATIONALE DES NPGOCIANTS EN OEUVRES
D'ART (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cinoa.org/cinoalperspectives?action-view&id=AWJwp
9yN1B8GfYskag3i (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) [https://perma.c/VU94-KUXF] (archived
Aug. 8, 2019) [hereinafter CINOA Position Paper]; Saperstein & Sant, supra note 40.
156. Reguly, supra note 70.
157. See McAndrew, supra note 113, at 15.




auction house has that a particular work was created by the stated
artist.160 A change in the level of confidence, made for perfectly
legitimate reasons, could result in a dramatic change in value.
Fluctuations in the art market and taste may also contribute to
volatility in price. Kathryn Tully of Forbes illustrates this phenomenon
using artistically similar works by Lee Bontecou, an American sculptor
of the 1960s and 1970s.161 Tully notes prior to 2003, Bontecou's auction
record stood at $46,000.162 Then, in that year, the artist was
"rediscovered," and one of her sculptures sold for $300,000.163 In 2010,
one of her sculptures sold for $1.87 million.16 4 While these dramatic
changes in value may raise red flags in other financial industries, they
are commonplace in the art market.16 5 Requiring art dealers to not only
track but also investigate these changes in value and the motives
behind them is impractical and burdensome.
De-risking, a concern frequently associated with new financial
regulation for banks, may also affect the art market.1
6 6 Instead of
managing and monitoring the risks of a particular client, banks will
cut off an entire group of clients who live in a particularly at-risk part
of the world.167 Individuals wanting to participate in the fine art
business and struggling due to a lack of financial services might be
forced to turn to less reliable alternatives, such as physically
transporting assets or illegal activities.168 As a result, many human
rights and immigrant communities strongly oppose de-risking
160. See generally CHRISTIE'S, IMPRESSIONIST AND MONDERN ART DAY SALE
AUCTION CATALOGUE, LONDON 280 (Feb. 28, 2019) (listing the glossary of terms for
authorship includes, named artist, attributed to artist, studio of artist, circle of artist,
style of . . . Follower of artist, Manner of artist, and After artist each with its own
separate meaning).
161. Kathryn Tully, Art Prices: What Goes Up Can Also Come Down, FORBES (Apr.




(archived Aug. 8. 2019).
162. Id.
163. Id.; see Price Database, ARTNET, http://www.artnet.com (last visited Sept. 2,
2019) [https://perma.cclNJ3F-8SR6] (archived Oct. 20, 2019) (follow "Use the Database"
hyperlink; then search for "Lee Bontecou") (the artwork is a welded steel construction on
canvas with copper wire that was estimated to sell between $50,000-70,000).
164. Id.
165. Collecting and Investing in Art, ART PRICE,
https://www.artprice.comlartprice-reports/the-art-market-in-
2 017/collecting-and-
investing-in-art (last visited Sept. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/G9Y8-HD9H] (archived Oct.
20, 2019) ("The appeal of Art as an investment stems from the exponential value
increases that affect certain works and, in certain cases, the media coverage they
attract."); see also FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, RBA GUIDANCE FOR DEALERS IN PRECIOUS
METAL AND STONES 23 (June 17, 2008). For example, the Financial Action Task Force
lists "a transaction that makes no sense, or that is excessive, given the circumstances, in
amount, or quality, or potential profit," as a risk factor for dealers in precious stones and
metals. Id.
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regulations, such as anti-money laundering laws, that could endanger
the lives of people in unstable parts of the world. 169 However, the
decision of banks and-as of late-art market participants to de-risk
in the face of regulations is justified.170 For example, although later
overturned by statute, in 2008, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted "violent acts or acts dangerous to human life" in an
antiterrorism statute to include money transfers to terrorist groups.1 7 1
This suggested that anyone who sent money to such a group, even as
part of a business transaction, could be guilty for up to fifty years for
damage caused by the group.1 72 The statute addressed this potential
interpretation, but the situation highlights how wide a net new
regulations could cast and why businesses may respond overly
cautiously in the face of new regulation.1 73 As written, neither measure
addresses de-risking or ensures access to financial markets for at-risk
communities.
2. Effect on Small and Medium-Size Dealers
The regulatory burden of the new measures will be felt by the
many middle-tier and smaller art dealers, with perhaps dramatic
consequences. The major players in the industry, international auction
houses like Sotheby's and Christie's, already have internal compliance
departments and, because of previously adopted internal policies,
likely comply with the proposed requirements or can easily internalize
any additional cost.174 It is at these auction houses where the headline-
grabbing sales and a majority of the industry's growth is taking
place.175
Medium and small art dealers, however, are not benefiting from
the industry's growth nearly as much as the top end of the market.176
The industry relies on these middle-tier dealers to discover new artists,
yet the rate of new galleries entering the market has dropped by 87
percent from 2007 to 2017.177 Further, these dealers run much smaller
169. Id.
170. EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive Program Notes, supra note 129.
171. Saperstein & Sant, supra note 40.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Buying at Christie's, CHRISTIE's, https://www.christies.com/buying-
services/buying-guide/financial-information/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/7745-DQ2U] (archived Oct. 1, 2019) (Christie's claims to have "a robust
[anti-money laundering] Programme which is managed by a global Compliance Team.");
Code of Business Conduct, SOTHEBY's, https://www.sothebys.com/content/damlsothebys/
PDFs/code-of-conduct-2019.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6RUY-LFVN]
(archived Oct. 1, 2019) (Sotheby's states that they have adopted anti-money laundering
guidelines and encourages those who have suspicious about a transaction or customer to
contact their compliance or legal departments).
175. See McAndrew, supra note 113, at 17.
176. See id. at 16.
177. Id.
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operations without the capacity to support an elaborate compliance
department. These galleries rely on their customer service, expertise,
and discretion to retain clients and compete against the much larger
players in the field. They will be hit the hardest by the new
regulations.'7 8
Dealers may face liability if they fail to inform authorities about
clients who trigger any of a series of red flags including: art prices
significantly below or above market value; antiques from areas of
recent conflict; minimal documentation; buyers insistence on cash
payments; multiple small cash payments for a single transaction;
agents acting on behalf of undisclosed buyers or sellers; and payments
made through third parties.'7 9 However, each of these supposed red
flags could result from completely benign motives.'
80 This situation
places galleries relying on the business of a few loyal customers, who
prefer discretion, in the uncomfortable position of making judgment
calls regarding their client's finances or face potential penalties. Many
of these galleries are run by art experts in fields such as nineteenth
century American painting or Han dynasty porcelain, who are ill-
suited to make judgment calls about potentially criminal acts.'
8 '
Instead, dealers will likely turn to regulatory technology
companies to remain in compliance with new regulations.
8 2 Not
surprisingly, some of these businesses are vocal supporters of
additional money laundering regulation.
83
Responding to the new regulations in the European Union, the
International Federation of Dealer Associations (CINOA) claims that
"these proposed amendments are built on the false assumption that the
European Union is subject to a high level of trafficking in cultural
property that is funding illegitimate interest."1
8 4 They point to a report
commissioned by the European Commission that shows little evidence
of terrorism financing stemming from the art market within the
European Union.8 5 Further, they argue the low threshold of C10,000
captures an extremely wide proportion of sales, since more than one-
178. See EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive Program Notes, supra note 129.
179. See Phoebe Kouvelas, Money Laundering Through Art: What All Stakeholder
Must Know, PRIVATE ART INV. (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.privateartinvestor.com/art-
business/money-laundering-through-art-what-all-stakeholders-must-know8
2 3 /
[https://perma.cc/55EP-37UN] (archived Aug. 8, 2019).
180. See supra Part II.B.2.
181. See Henri Neuendorf, Art Demystified: The Gallery Breakdown, ARTNET
NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/art-demystified-gallery-workers-
638201[https://perma.cc/SR6P-29C8] (archived Oct. 8, 2019).
182. Tony Ravel, Three Anti-Money-Laundering Trends Financial Institutions
Should Know in 2019, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbestechcouncil/2019/03/07/three-anti-money-laundering-trends-financial-
institutions-should-know-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/CG63-HNQT] (archived Aug. 8,
2019).
183. EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive Program Notes, supra note 129.
184. See CINOA Position Paper, supra note 155.
185. See id.
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quarter of all paintings and sculptures sold by dealers in the European
Union are priced at C45,000 or more.186 These same dealers are mostly
small businesses with annual turnovers under C1 million. 187 Thus,
CINOA believes dramatic expansion of the due-diligence obligations
will force dealers to pass on the cost of complying with the regulations
to clients or be forced out of business.1 8 8
3. Benefits of Additional Regulation
Although many arguments against the measures have merit, they
fail to recognize the possible added deterrence, aid to law enforcement,
and reputational benefits the new EU and potential US measures
provide.
Specific quantification of the impact of money laundering proves
challenging. Between 1994 and 2001, 9,169 defendants were convicted
of money laundering in US district courts.1 89 During the same time
period, about 60 percent of the laundering offenses prosecuted involved
an underlying property offense, such as embezzlement or fraud.19 0
Approximately nine in ten defendants prosecuted were convicted with
an average prison term of just over four years.19 1 The relatively low
number of defendants192 and high conviction rates lead some to argue
current measures are catching launderers effectively. 193
FinCEN claims that its data collected under the BSA "has proven
to be of considerable value in money laundering, terrorist financing
and other financial crimes investigations by law enforcement."194 Yet
the challenges advocates face in quantifying and defining the scope of
the problem makes it difficult to measure the potential benefits of the
new EU or US laws.
Further, the perceived significance of the issue is highlighted by
the amount of money involved. The international investigation into
IMalaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), the example referred to in
the first line of this Note, highlights how unwitting institutions, such
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Steiner, supra note 97, at 351, 366.
189. Motivans, supra note 28 (noting that money laundering defendants amounted
to 1.8 percent of all cases filed in U.S. district courts).
190. Id.
191. Id. The national conviction rate in 2016 was 91 percent. Mark Motivans,
Federal Justice Statistics, 2015-2016, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 9
(Jan. 2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjsl516.pdf [https://perma.ccl57GE-
BMFB] (archived Oct. 1, 2019).
192. Motivans, supra note 28.
193. Id.
194. The Value of FinCEN Data, FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement/case-examples?field tags investing
ation-targetid=674 (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) [https://perma.ccl97GS-BU7F] (archived
Aug. 8, 2019).
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as those in the art market, can be manipulated into causing significant
harm to taxpayers. 1MDB was a domestic fund created by the
Malaysian government to benefit the Malaysian people.195 Instead,
officials skimmed up to $6 billion to purchase luxury items including
art.96 Unwitting players, such as the art market, facilitated this theft.
The actor Leonardo DiCaprio voluntarily surrendered two paintings, a
$3.2 million Picasso and a $9 million Basquiat, that were gifted to him
by an individual associated with the misappropriated funds.'
9 7 This
saga is far from over, and the mastermind behind the illegal spending
spree is currently thought to be hiding in China.198 While the 1MDB
example highlights the need for strengthened regulations, it also
demonstrates the limitation of domestic regulations that contain
loopholes and lack international enforcement.
B. Structure of Current International "Soft Law" Regulation of Money
Laundering
Despite the lack of data, money laundering in the art market has
drawn the attention of international leaders.
9 9 At the 2017 G20
summit, world leaders issued a statement for all countries to "address
all alternative sources of financing of terrorism" including the looting
and smuggling of antiquities.200 International organizations, such as
the Responsible Art Market Initiative among others, have sprung up
to provide new guidelines and recommendations for the industry.
201
However, no formal effort is being made to solve the problem. China, a
rapidly growing player in the art world,
202 has a reputation of
extremely lax regulation of the art market.203 By acting unilaterally,
the European Union and United States may push more of the industry
to conduct business in other countries as consumers look to avoid
higher costs and regulatory disclosures.
Though the European Union and United States are by far the
largest players in the international art market,
204 their failure to
195. Elizabeth A. Harris & Alexandra Stevenson, A Yacht, a Monet, a See-Through
Piano: The U.S. Collects on a Fugitive's Shopping Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/09/arts/jho-low-lmdb-assets-piano.html
[https://perma.cc/3T4J-TWJW] (archived Aug. 8, 2019).
196. Heurtevent & Chiariello, supra note 64, at 258.
197. Id.
198. Harris & Stevenson, supra note 195.
199. See ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, supra note 120, at 242 (noting that sixty-
five percent of wealth managers, sixty-one percent of art professionals and forty-nine
percent of collectors surveyed felt that money laundering is a serious threat to the
credibility of the art market).
200. Heurtevent & Chiariello, supra note 64, at 256.
201. ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, supra note 120, at 237.
202. See McAndrew, supra note 113, at 15, 28, 34.
203. See ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, supra note 120, at 237.
204. Id.
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involve the greater international financial regulatory community will
undermine and limit the effectiveness of their measures. Efforts
toward a formal agreement, such as an international treaty, face added
complexities based on the nature of international financial regulation.
The shortcomings of the EU and US measures stem from their
limitations as domestic measures. More comprehensive regulation is
available through international cooperation utilizing existing
international financial regulation strategies.
1. Overview of International "Soft Law" Agreements
International law is commonly characterized as hard or soft.205
Hard law includes legally binding obligations that delegate authority
to interpret and implement a legal rule.20 6 Soft law is best described as
a wide category of agreements that acts as a "continuum . .. running
between fully binding treaties and fully political positions."207 Soft law
includes nonbinding rules or agreements that shape our
understanding of binding legal rules or act as promises that create
expectations of future conduct.208
International hard law dominates areas such as international
trade and monetary affairs that are regulated by the World Trade
Organization and the International Monetary Fund, respectively.20 9
Hard law agreements generally are viewed as more credible
commitments, since they have direct legal effect on countries and
usually carry higher costs for violation, in the form of legal sanctions
or reputational costs.210 Additionally, hard law agreements usually
allow for easier monitoring by other parties and establish dispute
resolution procedures.21 1 Critics of hard law note that they contain
high sovereignty costs, meaning that countries may forgo their current
domestic best interest because of the high consequences of reneging on
past hard law agreements.2 12 These sovereignty costs are thought to
be particularly high when hard law agreements involve accepting an
external authority over significant political or economic decisions.21 3
Because countries may be skeptical of binding themselves in the
205. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard us. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010)
(discussing the range of definitions and classifications for hard and soft international
law).
206. Id. at 714-15.
207. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171, 173 (2010).
208. Id. at 174.
209. See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance-And
Not Trade, 13 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 623, 623 (2010) [hereinafter Brummer 11.
210. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 205, at 717-18.
211. Id.
212. Brummer I, supra note 209, at 631-32.
213. Id. at 632.
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future, hard law agreements are frequently filled with vague
commitments with few details, which then reduces the value of the
original agreement.214
In contrast, most international financial law is informal and
nonbinding, with intergovernmental institutions setting "best
practices" guidelines via consensus and countries enacting domestic
regulations in accordance with these guidelines.21 5 Central banks,
regulatory agencies, and finance ministers act as the primary
negotiators for international financial policies.2 16 Additionally,
independent international organizations assist in setting standards
over narrower areas of finance.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an example of a
'specialist' standard-setting body," is tasked with preventing money
laundering in foreign financial centers.217 This type of organization
usually issues regulations in the form of best practices, which, in
reality, reflect the generally accepted practice in the international
community.2 18 Additionally, these agencies issue regulatory reports,
which examine deficiencies or issues with current practice or
regulatory schemes.2 19 These reports, in many instances, work in a
similar manner to formal commitments since signatories are expected
"not to engage in behavior contrary to or conflicting with the values or
norms expressed in the reports."2 20 Because of this underlying
expectation of compliance, parties vigorously negotiate these
reports.221
Soft-law international agreements offer many advantages, such as
lowering the costs of entering into agreements, increasing flexibility,
allowing for "deeper" cooperation, and developing common norms.
222
Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer suggest four theories that may
motivate a country to prefer soft law for an international agreement.
223
First, soft law may solve a coordination problem.
224 Once countries
establish a set of rules, they may have faith that those same rules will
remain effective into the future without additional pressure.
225 Second,
soft law agreements allow countries to exercise efficient breach, similar
to contract law.*226 Third, soft law offers counties the opportunity to
214. Id. at 633.
215. Id. at 627.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 628-29.
219. Id. at 629.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 205 at 719.
223. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 207 at 171.
224. Id. at 176.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 177 (Hard law is thought to have greater "compliance pull" than soft
law because of greater costs for volition. The costs include lost reputation, retaliation or
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encourage amendment of the rules unilaterally. 227 Finally, soft law
standards issued by international institution allow for thorough,
complex regulations to be established that may not have been reached
if each rule needed unanimous support before agreement, such as a
hard law treaty.228
Soft law is preferable in areas such as financial regulation since it
allows for greater experimentation-allowing regulators or motivate
countries to adjust and modify policies as their impact becomes
clear.229 When problems are increasingly complex and poorly
understood, states may be skeptical of any binding agreement. Instead,
soft law agreements allow "parties to agreements ... to see the impact
of rules in practice in order to better assess their benefits... [while]
retain[ing] the flexibility to avoid any unpleasant surprises the rules
may hold." 23 0
Some see soft law as an illegitimate form of international
agreement because of the lack of formal, binding commitment.231
However, international financial regulation carries additional
incentives for compliance-markets.232 Healthy markets will attract
investment and confidence while inefficient rules and regulations will
push business elsewhere.233
Another common criticism of international financial regulation
concerns the membership composition of organizations such as the
FATF.2 34 Many groups, while claiming to be open to all interested
countries, are founded and motivated by developed and wealthier
nations.235 The result is that most of these international standard-
setting bodies' membership are made up exclusively of wealthy,
developed countries.236 This allows wealthy countries to create
regulations and then effectively demand that developing nations who
wish to participate in the global marketplace adhere to them.237 Critics
view this paternalistic approach as motivated by protecting developed
countries' interests to the detriment of global welfare.238
reciprocal noncompliance. Unlike efficient breach when one party gains from the
noncompliance, these costs are simply lost, creating an inefficiency.)
227. Id. at 178.
228. Id. at 201-02.
229. Brummer I, supra note 209, at 632.
230. Id. at 633.
231. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 413, 414 (1983) (criticizing the expansion of soft law since it fails to strengthen
the international system and dilutes international obligations).
232. Brummer I, supra note 209, at 638.
233. Id. at 639.
234. Id. at 642 (noting legitimacy criticism and developing countries' lack of
influence is not limited to soft law international institutions and is also a criticism of the
World Trade Organization).
235. Saperstein & Sant, supra note 40.
236. Brummer I, supra note 209, at 633.
237. Saperstein & Sant, supra note 40.
238. Brummer I, supra note 209, at 642.
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2. The Role of the FATF in Anti-Money Laundering Regulation
International financial regulation is currently governed by soft
law agreements.23 9 Commentators note that there is no prospect of a
hard law international treaty and very little support for one.
240 The
reality is that not all countries support greater anti-money laundering
regulations, which frequently undermine law enforcement's ability to
follow the money.241 The most prominent regulatory authority for
international financial crimes is the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF).
The FATF was launched in 1989 and in 1990 drafted a
comprehensive set of good governance standards to address financial
crimes and to promote international cooperation.242 The FATF issued
new standards after concern over terror financing through
international financial crimes rose in 2001.243 The FATF then
completely reviewed and updated its guidelines in 2003.244 Currently,
thirty-seven countries are members of the FATF.24 5 The organization
now monitors the implementation of recommendations through on-site
reviews and analysis of the legislative and regulatory frameworks of
high-risk and noncooperative jurisdictions.
246
Currently, the FATF labels fourteen jurisdictions as having
strategic anti-money laundering or combating the financing of
terrorism deficiencies.247 Though the FATF does not have the ability
to pursue punishments or reforms on its own, it encourages its
members to adopt countermeasures against uncooperative states that
are failing to combat money laundering schemes.248 The "punishment"
usually comes from G-7 conferences, meetings involving the largest
239. Id.
240. See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99
CORNELL L. REv. 735, 784 (2014).
241. See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It
Doesn't), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 295-96 (2011) [hereinafter Brummer II].
242. Id. at 296.
243. Id. at 297.
244. Id.
245. FATF Members, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries/#FATF (last visited Aug. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2QSB-Z5VG]
(archived Aug. 8, 2019) (members include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia Federation, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States).
246. See Brummer II, supra note 241, at 297.
247. High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#high-risk (last visited Aug. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
B9SF-ZVBH] (archived Aug. 8, 2019) (the high-risk jurisdictions include Bahamas,
Botswana, Cambodia, North Korea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Pakistan, Panama, Sri
Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Yemen).
248. See Brummer II, supra note 241, at 290, 296.
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economies in the world, and unilateral actions taken by the United
States, who imposed costly requirements on US institutions doing
business with a similar list of "noncooperative jurisdictions."249
In July 2018, the FATF released a report which concentrates on
professional money launderers who specialize in assisting criminals in
evading anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing
safeguards and sanctions.250 The report stresses the importance of
international information sharing to ensure effective policing. 251 Many
large-scale professional money launderers work as a network.252 They
may employ professionals from a variety of fields, including
accountants, lawyers, bankers, and also dealers in precious metals or
stones.25 3
Although the FATF recognizes that the art market is susceptible
to money laundering and terrorist financing, the authority has not
created guidelines and best practices to apply to its members.254 This
has prevented more coordinated action among international players.
IV. REFORM TO EFFECTIVELY DETER AND CATCH MONEY LAUNDERING
IN THE ART MARKET
While acknowledging that the EU and US measures include many
of the essential first steps to protect the art market from exploitation
by money laundering, the measures fall short in two critical respects.
First, the lack of international involvement greatly limits the potential
effect of regulation, and second, the measures fail to establish
international information sharing to support regulatory and law
enforcement efforts.
As money launderers become more attenuated from the original
illicit act, their apprehension will remain difficult. 255 In order to
effectively combat international money laundering, countries must
coordinate efforts internationally to prevent international players from
avoiding domestic regulations.2 56 Since art is an attractive tool for
international money laundering, effective preventative measures must
be international in scope. While the European Union and United
States comprise 75 percent of the art market, this percentage will drop
by 21 percent if or when the United Kingdom exits the European
249. Id.
250. PROFESSIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24, at 30.
251. See id. at 17.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 18.
254. Christ, supra note 11.
255. See PROFESSIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24, at 17.
256. See generally Wright, supra note 4.
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Union.2 57 Although the United Kingdom will continue to follow
domestic measures enacted under the current EU directives, such as
the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering directive, this situation highlights
the limitations of unilateral regulation.258 Further, the reported high-
profile examples of art market money laundering schemes, many of
which have been mentioned in this paper, all involve countries other
than the US and EU members.25 9 As this problem reaches beyond the
United States and European Union, the solution must also be
international in scope.
Soft law provides a practical and effective path for additional
money laundering standards and international coordination. Meyer
suggests soft law is effective in the face of uncertainty surrounding a
common interest or in the face of shifting power dynamics between
countries.260 Soft law is thought to contain comparably lower penalties
for noncompliance with international norms than hard law, which
directly creates new legal obligations.261 Lower penalties for
noncompliance encourages states to agree to rules developed by
international organizations, since reneging on these rules later carries
lower costs.262 Soft law will be particularly appealing to the United
States and European Union who currently amount for a majority of the
international art market. Where one or a small group of countries is
more powerful in a particular issue, they are likely the only states with
incentives to innovate and create new regulations.2
6 3 This scenario is
playing out as these two actors are implementing and proposing
regulations without greater international participation. Soft law will
provide a means for the major stakeholders to establish international
norms, which other countries will likely join, without overly restricting
their own future behavior.264 This approach mirrors the solution
currently in place to address other international financial concerns
through the FATF. 2 65
257. See McAndrew, supra note 113, at 34; New Anti-Money Laundering
Regulations Target the Art Market, ARn@LAW (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.artatlaw.com
/archives/new-anti-money-laundering-regulations-target-art-market [https://perma.cc/
98BD-D3JN] (archived Aug. 8, 2019).
258. Id.
259. Harris & Stevenson, supra note 195; Cohen, supra note 55.
260. Timothy L. Meyer, Shifting Sands: Power, Uncertainty and the Form of
International Legal Cooperation, 27 EUR. J. INT'L L. 161, 162 (2016).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Timothy L. Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 888,
918-19 (2009).
264. See id.
265. See FATF Guidance, Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
Measures and Financial Inclusion (Nov. 2017), http://www.fatf-gafl.org/medialfatf/
content/images/Updated-2017-FATF-2013-Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3N8-BNKQ]
(archived Oct. 1, 2019).
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The FATF's effectiveness highlights the importance and impact
that soft law agreements can have for financial regulation.266 The
thirty-six members of the FATF include China, representing the
second largest segment of the art market, as well as Brazil and
Malaysia-all countries involved in the high-profile art market money
laundering examples mentioned above.267 The FATF structure is ideal
for the development of best practice standards for countries involved
in the art market. The FATF has considered the complexity of money
laundering regulation and examined many of the concerns explained
in this Note, including de-risking, the financial burdens of regulation,
and the strengths of a risk-based approach.268 Such a forum will allow
rules to be developed that are tailored to the art market in contrast to
simply expanding preexisting money laundering statutes and leaving
the details to be decided later. Previously, the FATF has issued best
practices for other industries including the legal profession, casinos,
and traders in precious metals and stones.269 By issuing best practice
guidelines for the art market, the FATF can quickly establish an
international norm for art dealers and regulators worldwide.
The FATF guidelines for the art market should focus on two main
areas: KYC requirements for all participants in the art market and
international standardization to facilitate information sharing to
assist enforcement efforts. Art market participants must be required
to gather client information. Without KYC requirements, luxury goods
purveyors and art dealers can continue to claim that they were misled
by international money launderers and express sympathy to those
harmed, without taking responsibility.270 The FATF KYC guidelines
for the art market should focus on the type of information to be
gathered and the required process to verify. Many groups have already
suggested specific criteria, some of which are covered in the EU and
proposed US measures. The Basel Institute's risk-based approach asks
art dealers to create risk profiles that consider: location of sale, past
location of art object, delivery method, type of service provided,
payment method, client profiles, and the value of the art object.2 71 This
risk-based approach recognizes the interests of the global community
to regulate, without placing undue burden on low-risk operations.2 72
By monitoring risk, standards and rules can be differentiated
266. See Brummer II, supra note 241, at 256.
267. FATF Members, supra note 245; Harris & Stevenson, supra note 195; Cohen,
supra note 55.
268. FATF Guidance, supra note 265.
269. See generally RBA GUIDANCE FOR DEALERS IN PRECIOUS METAL AND STONES,
supra note 165.
270. See Harris & Stevenson, supra note 195.
271. See Basel Art Trade Anti-Money Laundering Principles, supra note 8.
272. See RBA GUIDANCE FOR DEALERS IN PRECIOUS METAL AND STONES, supra
note 165, at 6 (suggesting that the potential benefits of a risk-based approach include
better management of risks, effective allocation of resources, focus on identifiable threats
and flexibility).
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depending on the nature of a business or dealer, with specific
guidelines to ensure resources are deployed strategically.
2 73
Consistent with other anti-money laundering best practices, the
FATF should also list red flags that may signal attempted money
laundering. Borrowing again from the Basel Institute, red flags should
include: reluctance to provide identifying information, cash payments,
multiple payment methods, questioning suspicious activity procedures,
artificially low or inflated prices, individuals known to be associated
with individuals under investigation, and those who live in high-risk
jurisdictions.274 Finally, the guideline should mandate that art market
participants identify beneficial owners on both the supplier and buyer
sides of a transaction.2 75 A beneficial owner is defined by the Basel
Institute as a natural person, a company on a publicly accessible
register, or a publicly traded company.276 Requiring beneficial owner
identification prevents launderers from using shell corporations to
hide the identities of parties to a transaction. The Panama Papers
exposed the prevalence of such practices.27 7 If a client provides all of
this information without raising red flags, the transaction may
proceed.
However, if there is suspicion over the transaction, then the FATF
guidelines should require participants to verify client data. Placing this
requirement on art dealers alone could be financially ruinous and
encourage willful ignorance.27 8 Instead, the FATF should create
guidelines for domestic law enforcement to share the responsibility.
The suggested verification requirement can be satisfied in two ways:
by verification for client information on an approved domestic
database, such as one operated by FinCEN for SARs;
279 or by
private/in-house investigation. Submitting a red-flagged client to this
database in good faith will protect the art business from liability. A
similar safe harbor provision operates for SAR submissions allowing a
financial institution to gain peace of mind by taking proactive
action.280
The goal of domestic databases is twofold. First, weighing money
laundering red flags is outside the expertise and profession of art
dealers and should be handled by experts. Second, while businesses are
emerging that provide KYC services, requiring middle-tier and small
dealers to pay for these investigations, either internally or by third
parties, will be crippling. Database verification and maintenance can
273. See id. at 3.
274. See Basel Art Trade Anti-Money Laundering Principles, supra note 8.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Reyburn, supra note 6.
278. See supra Part IH.A.2.
279. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 31
C.F.R. § 1010.540 (2018).
280. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2018); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(e).
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easily live under the jurisdiction of FinCEN and their equivalent
institutions. The databases will create paper trails for clients of the art
market, allowing for law enforcement o spot suspicious activity.
Domestic government-run databases will allow art market
participants to quickly and economically investigate clients. Using the
database would act as a safe harbor from money-laundering liability;
if a client is on the database without a red flag, those facilitating the
transaction will be immune from prosecution.28 1 This process will
incentivize use of the database, especially by smaller dealers without
the capacity to investigate clients on their own. These databases will
be monitored by domestic law enforcement, who will be responsible for
flagging potential money launderers posing as legitimate clients.
By creating globally standardized systems, countries will be able
to better share information internationally. The FATFs standards will
create a uniform system for information collection and may facilitate
further international sharing.28 2 If clients are flagged domestically, a
country is in a better position to share that information with other
FATF members. Further, by communicating flagged clients to all
participating countries, money launderers will be unable to escape
detection by avoiding a particular jurisdiction.
Art market participants will not be forced to use the databases.
Institutions who have the capabilities to investigate their clients will
be allowed to do so, so long as they comply with KYC minimum
requirements outlined above. Larger businesses may prefer this option
to offer premium clients added discretion or added confidence in the
other party to the transaction. Participants who choose to have in-
house investigation systems must make them available for audits by
domestic financial regulatory agencies and will not receive safe harbor
protection. While this may look like a burdensome responsibility for
regulatory agencies, transactions at the top of the art market are
mainly captured by Sotheby's and Christie's, the two largest
international auction houses, leaving few other businesses with the
ability to support internal investigations.283 This means in practice,
agencies will only have to conduct a few audits, since many
participants will opt for the low-cost shared database.
A KYC requirement will likely achieve wide acceptance, as many
art dealer associations have suggested that such procedures are best
281. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540 (stipulating how a voluntary information sharing
program operates for financial institutions and how by sharing information voluntarily,
an institution generally is protected from liability).
282. Formal information sharing for criminal investigations is governed by mutual
legal assistance treaties which are beyond the scope of this Note. See Wright, supra note
4, at 256-62 (reform of the mutual legal assistance process in the face of terrorist
financing); see also Magnus Hornquist, Sovereign Display and Fiscal Techniques: Some
Notes on Recent Strategies to Counteract Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 50
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 933, 960 (2017).
283. See generally ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, supra note 120.
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practices to protect the integrity of the industry.
284 One of the leading
industry-supported organizations, Responsible Art Market, suggests
similar guidelines that incorporate a risk-based approach, red flag
factors, KYC requirements, and staff training.2 85 Additionally,
providing a low-cost alternative to conducting in-house verification will
lessen the regulatory burden on medium and smaller size
participants.2 8 6 By making the database voluntary, regulators are less
likely to face pushback from the larger art market participants who
may choose to continue to use internal anti-money laundering
procedures. With 77 percent of art professionals preferring self-
regulation to government regulation, creating a flexible system is
potentially a realistic compromise.
28 7
This strategy will only be effective if sufficient resources are
dedicated to law enforcement efforts. The relatively few examples of
money laundering in the art market perhaps indicate the problem is
not yet widespread; however, the low number may also speak to a lack
of serious commitment by law enforcement. Examples, such as the
1MDB investigation which spans years and literally the entire world,
illustrate that researching and prosecuting international money
laundering is a costly, time-intensive process.
Further analysis of current law enforcement efforts and the data
gathered must be conducted before more stringent regulations go into
effect. At present, FinCEN collects a massive amount of information
from financial institutions across the country to aid law enforcement
officials.28 8 While FinCEN claims this data is critical in law
enforcement, the lack of substantial statistical information is a barrier
to establishing corollary regulations. As a result, law enforcement
efforts should be coupled with the commissioning of further reports and
analysis of money laundering in the international art market. If money
laundering in the art market amounts to even a minor portion of the
projected scale of the international money laundering problem, more
stringent requirements will be warranted.
289
284. See Code of Ethics, supra note 19.
285. Hardy, supra note 148.
286. See supra Part III.A.2.
287. ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, supra note 120, at 237.
288. See What is the BSA Data?, FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/what-bsa-data (last visited Feb. 28, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/3NH4-Y9WE] (archived Aug. 8. 2019) ("Over 15 million BSA reports
are filed each year by more than 25,000 U.S. financial institutions, providing a wealth of
potentially useful information to agencies whose mission is to detect and prevent money
laundering, other financial crimes and terrorism.").
289. See Money-Laundering and Globalization, supra note 118.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the lack of significant, tangible evidence of money
laundering through fine art and antiquities dealers, international
regulators, governments, and the media have brought increased
scrutiny on the art market. With concerns related to terrorist financing
and headline-grabbing international incidents, it seems domestic
legislators in the two jurisdictions hosting the majority of the art
industry appear ready to initiate new regulations designed to detect
and deter money laundering. However, unilateral regulations will fail
to protect the industry and may place crippling burdens on many art
market participants. The international soft law regulations proposed
by this Note provide a flexible, practical path to utilize current
international financial regulatory strategies to close loopholes created
by the international nature of the industry and detect criminal efforts
to hide proceeds from their illegal activities in the art market.
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